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We analyze the role of nature and geography in determining economic and 
social outcomes. We propose a theoretical model relating geography and 
nature to economic growth, and examine that model using data from NUTS 
2 European regions. By doing this, we identify the predictive power of first-
nature variables to explain regional population distribution. Then we analyze 
the effects of misadjustment between the actual and predicted distribution of 
populations on economic performance. Our results indicate that deviating 
from first-nature outcomes has a significant negative effect on economic 
growth. Furthermore, we find that departing from natural endowment has a 
negative effect on social cohesion. The main policy implication emerging 
from our analysis is that strategies that harmonize with nature and 
geography yield better social welfare and human well-being than those 
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Geography and Regional Economic Growth: The high cost of deviating from nature 
 
Throughout history, humanity has made unimaginable progress, not only overcoming 
the obstacles or conditioning factors of nature and geography, but even putting them to use in 
the service of its aspirations and interests. Indeed, communities have been able to survive, 
develop and flourish in settlements with hostile climates, to overcome the limits set by water – 
the barrier effects of large rivers and oceans – and the terrain, with its harshness and geological 
complexity. The vast knowledge acquired and applied over time has led to technological 
advancement and hence to the possibility of mankind adapting to its environment and vice 
versa.  
This progress has inspired several scholars to write of the end of geography (O’Brien 
1992) and the death of distance (Cairncross 1995; 2001), and to describe the new era as that of 
a placeless society, a shrinking, flat world (Friedman 2005), all due to advances in 
transportation, information and communication technologies. At the same time, the most 
isolated places in the world have become easily accessible. This has allowed the development 
of prosperous settlements, now integrated into the global economy, that would otherwise have 
been challenged by the limiting features attributable to their natural environments. Human life 
has apparently become liberated from the constraints of space and frictional effects of distance 
(Graham 1998). 
Neglecting the ever-present role and restraints of nature and geography may be 
premature. Regarding the so-called death of distance, Rietveld and Vickerman (2004) pointed 
out that many economic activities have not become that ‘footloose’, due to transaction costs 
and other reasons. In fact, proximity to higher-tiered urban centers continues to be an important 
positive determinant of local job growth, despite the alleged death of distance (Partridge et al. 
2008). International conflicts, past and current economic dilemmas and challenges worldwide 
also exhibit a strong relationship with geography and nature, even now (Senese 2005; Starr 
2005; Kaplan 2012). 
The role of nature and geography has been and still is crucial to understanding many of 
the social, political and economic outcomes and prospects of human settlements. From a 
historical perspective, the capacity of the environment to support human life has commonly 
been considered a major restraint on population growth, density and prosperity. This idea has 
been discussed, for instance, by Machiavelli (1519), Botero (1588) and Montesquieu (1748), 
and formed part of the famous demographic theory of Malthus (1798). Even earlier, Plato and 
Aristotle expressed concerns about overpopulation and limited resources. Thus, thinkers and 
3 
 
scholars alike have long spoken of the importance of place and natural constraints and 
endowments for the location and density of human settlements and their effects on economic 
prospects.  
In economic geography models, agglomerations are expected to be located and to 
develop according to a set of first-nature and second-nature determinants (Krugman 1993). 
Among first-nature determinants, geography and nature play the most crucial role. Thus, 
economic activity depends on the physical landscape, climate, access to the sea and to navigable 
rivers, etc. Clearly though, human action and incentives define the second-nature determinants 
that lead to increasing returns, due to scale and density economies, knowledge spillovers, etc. 
(Krugman 1991). Labor migrations between regions are responses to market signals and they 
determine the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces (Krugman and Venables 
1990). Locational advantages – attributable to geography and nature – favor the concentration 
and mobility of human and economic settlements (Ellisson and Glaeser 1999; Glaeser and 
Shapiro 2003; Black and Henderson 1998), leading to both the concentration of populations 
and the growth of productivity (Beeson 2001; Mitchener and McLean 2003).  
The most extensive strand in the literature exploring this relationship is the one 
concerned with the role played by geography in relation to economic growth and development 
(Diamond 1997; Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001). A recent article 
by Mitton (2016) evaluates the determinants of economic development in 1,867 subnational 
regions of 101 countries, focusing on within-country effects of geography and institutions. 
Several geographic factors had significant explanatory power for within-country differences in 
per-capita GDP, including terrain ruggedness, tropical climate, ocean access, temperature 
range, storm risk and natural resources such as oil, diamonds, and iron. Beyond the constraints 
imposed on economic prosperity, some authors have also argued that geography may have an 
impact on institutions, another relevant set of economic determinants (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Moreover, this strand of the literature points 
out that even though it is still a determining factor, once institutions are accounted for, the 
contribution of geography as a determinant of economic growth is partially diminished 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi 2004). 
Geography and nature provide an endowment that may facilitate the location, 
concentration and growth of some settlements or make these more difficult in the case of others. 
This dependence can be tempered or even completely reversed by the intervention of human 
capital accumulation that translates into knowledge and technical advances (Glaeser et al. 2004; 
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Bhattacharyya 2009) and/or by means of institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002), 
which use a framework of incentives, regulations and investments.  
In this article, we propose a theoretical model of the way in which features of geography 
and nature can account for regional economic growth, due to their effects on population density 
and distribution. This model is empirically examined using data from comparable European 
regions. We identify the strong predictive power of first-nature variables in explaining regional 
population density and capital city location, to the extent that we can estimate the degree of 
geographic harmonization of the actual distribution compared to the predicted distribution. This 
allows us to detect deviations produced by the forces of human action, led mainly by 
institutions, and to evaluate the predicted consequences in terms of relative economic 
performance. Our main results indicate that deviating from nature’s outcomes has a significant 
negative effect on economic growth and may also produce larger inequalities. This result 
suggests that societies that opt to accommodate to the provisions of nature, and consequently, 
to exploit the opportunities of the best locations, rather than forcing a different distribution of 
the population across regions, perform better.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Next, we propose the theoretical 
model. After that we present the data and the empirical model that allows calculatating 
deviations by considering actual versus predicted population density and capital city location, 
across regions and countries. Then, we interpret the results focusing on the countries that 
deviate the most. The economic cost of deviations is estimated in the subsequent section, where 
an econometric convergence growth model is estimated. Finally, we discuss our main results 
and conclude.  
 
Regional economic model 
The aim of this section is to provide a conceptual model for understanding how population 
distribution and geography could impact economic growth. 
Let us consider a closed economy formed by M regions. Let us assume that all of them occupy 
an equal area (equal to 1 to normalize), have equal access to technology 𝐴 and a neoclassical 
production function of the form: 
 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑔 , 𝐾 , 𝐷 ) = 𝐺(𝑔 )𝐴𝐾 𝐷  (1) 
where Ki is the capital of a region i, Di the total population living in the region (since area is 
equal to one, this is density of population), gi its geographic endowment and G(g) a function 




𝑌 =  𝑌  (2) 
Firms’ maximization problem 
Let us consider that a large number of firms face the classic problem of profit maximization 
under conditions of competitive labor and capital markets in every region i: 
 ∏ =  max
,
𝐹 (𝑔 , 𝐾, 𝐷) − 𝑅 𝐾 − 𝑤 𝐷 (3) 
First-order conditions imply that capital and labor are paid their marginal contributions: 
  𝑤 =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐷





For there to be an equilibrium, assuming that financial markets are competitive and there are no 
externalities, we need the return on capital to be equal in all regions. Proposition 1 shows that 
there is equilibrium only in allocation of capital between the different regions. 
Proposition 1 
Let us note by K the total amount of capital in the economy. Let us also note by Ki = tiK, with 0 
< ti < 1 and ∑ 𝑡 = 1, the capital of the region i. Then, given D1, ..., DM, there exist unique 
values 𝑡∗, … , 𝑡∗  such that Ri = Rj for all i and j. These values correspond to a proportional 












Let us note that Yi(t) = Yi(gi, tK, Di). Then, 
 










𝑌 (1 − 𝑡 )
(1 − 𝑡 )𝐾
 
Let us note that 𝑋 (𝑡) =  
( )





𝑡𝐾 − 𝑌 (𝑡)
𝑡
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𝛼𝑌 (𝑡) − 𝑌 (𝑡)
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Using the same reasoning, 𝑋 (𝑡) =  
( )
 is increasing in t. Then, since limt→0 X1(t) = ∞ and 
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Consider now the case of M > 2. By induction hypothesis, let us assume that the results 
hold for M regions. We want to see whether it holds if we consider an economy with M + 1. Let 
us define,  
 




Where 𝑡 , … , 𝑡  are the unique 𝑡  (which exist by induction hypothesis) such that ∑ 𝑡 = 1 and 
𝛽 ≡
( )
=    for all i and j. Notice that 𝑡  does not depend on t, because the last equality 
holds for all 𝑡 ∈ (0,1).  




𝑡𝑡 𝐾 − 𝑡 𝑌
(𝑡 𝑡)
=  (𝛼 − 1)
𝑡 𝑌
(𝑡 𝑡)





and limt→1 X(t) = ∞. Note that 𝑋 (𝑡) =  
( )
  . As in the case of two regions, there 
exists t∗ such that X(t∗) = XM+1(t∗), and by the induction hypothesis, there exist t1, ..., tM , such 
that Xi(tit∗) = XM+1(t∗) 
 
Household maximization problem 
Let us assume that households can choose where to locate and can move without any costs. 
Let us assume that utility of region i is a function of the form: 
 𝑢 (𝑤 , 𝐷 ) = 𝑓(𝑤 +  𝜏 ) + 𝑒(𝐷 ) (5) 
where f is a concave and strictly increasing function, wi is the net income per capita after 
taxes in the region i, τi represents public transfers per capita at region i and e(Di) = aD2 + bDi 
represents the externalities associated with density of population. Following theoretical models 
in urban economics (e.g., O’Sullivan 2007; Duranton and Puga 2020) we assume that increasing 
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density in lowly populated areas has a positive effect (e.g., accessibility of a greater diversity 
of goods and services), but at a certain point externalities become negative (e.g., congestion or a 
rise in land prices). Thus, a < 0 and b > 0. 
The household maximization challenge is to choose the region i that maximizes utility. 
To illustrate which kind of equilibrium will be reached, let us consider, w.l.g., the case of two 
regions. 
Proposition 2 
Let us note by Di, i = 1, 2, the population living in region i. Then, D = D1 + D2 and D1 = tD, 
with t ∈ [0, 1]. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium 
in population distribution between region 1 and 2, given capitals K1 and K2 are: 
i) t = 1 and u1(D) > u2(0), or 
ii) t = 0 and u1(0) < u2(D), or 
iii) t ∈ (0, 1) and 
( )
< 0 
 When one of the two regions is empty, the equilibrium is Pareto optimal if, and only if, 
household utility of the non-empty region at D is higher than the maximum utility of the other 
region. 
Proof: 
For there to be an equilibrium, expected utility gain from moving has to be non-positive. First, 
for i) and ii), let us consider, w.l.g., that t = 1. If u1(D) < u2(0), then the whole population would 
move to region 2, so t = 1 is an equilibrium if, and only if, u1(D) > u2(0). For iii), let us consider 
that there is an equilibrium between regions 1 and 2, and people living in both. Since there 
cannot be any utility gain from moving, utility in both regions has to be the same. Thus,  
𝑢  ≡ 𝑢 (𝑡𝐷) = 𝑢 ((1 − 𝑡)𝐷) 
Let us consider, w.l.g., that 
( )
> 0. Then, the marginal gain from moving from 2 to 1 is: 
𝑢 (𝐷 +  𝜀) − 𝑢  ≈ 𝑢 (𝐷 ) +  
𝜕𝑢 (𝐷 )
𝜕𝐷
𝜀 − 𝑢 =  
𝜕𝑢 (𝐷 )
𝜕𝐷
𝜀 < 0  
or all ε > 0, small enough. Thus, households would be better off moving to region 1, and the 
distribution would not hold to a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 present examples of the two equilibria for an economy with α = 0.3, g1 
= 1, g2 = 1.1, K = 200, a = −5·10−3 and b = 3.75·10−2. For the single region equilibrium, total 
population is 30. The red dotted line represents the utility people would get if they lived in the 




Figure 1: Single region equilibrium where the whole population lives in the best region. 
 
For the two-region equilibrium (Figure 2), total population is 100. The 10 percent 
relative difference in geographic endowment translates into a 22 percent relative difference in 
population density. 
 
Figure 2: Two-region equilibrium. 
 
Let us now discuss briefly how equilibria would change if there were moving costs c 
and information asymmetries, so that people from one region could not know exactly what 
their utility would be if they moved to the other region. Notice that they will remain in their 
regions if the expected increase in utility is lower than the moving costs: 
𝑢 + 𝜀 − 𝑢 < 𝑐,    𝑢 +  𝜀 − 𝑢 < 𝑐 
where ε  represents the information asymmetry, that is, the error of households in 
region i when trying to anticipate what their utility would be after moving. Notice that 
derivatives do not play any role in this case. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3, two-region 
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equilibrium is no longer guaranteed to be Pareto efficient, since the fact that those who move 
bear the whole cost of moving could deter people from doing so, even when the social gain 
from the utility increase produced by reducing the over-population externality could be much 
higher than the private cost of moving. In this situation, a government intervention could make 
everybody better off by, for example, subsidizing the moving cost. In other words, a non-
Pareto efficient equilibrium with moving cost (left figure) can be Pareto improved (right figure) 
if moving costs -grey area- are subsidized (or if people are forced to move). Utility gains derived 








The model has three main implications. First, population distribution tends toward extreme 
outcomes and over-population. Geographic differences may lead to empty and over-populated 
regions, with respect to their optimal level. Moreover, relatively small differences in geographic 
endowment can also lead to much larger differences in population density. Second, the model 
predicts that areas with better geographic attributes will have higher densities of population (as 
in Beeson 2001; Mitchener and McLean 2003), unless there is much more public expenditure 
in worse areas or a historical legacy that cannot be overcome because of moving costs or 
incomplete information. In both cases, the result will be a non-Pareto equilibrium with lower 
utility and higher inequality. Third, more densely populated areas will tend to have higher output 
and capital per capita (as in Krugman 1991).1 
                                                        
1 In Krugman the causality channel is due to externalities in production. 
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As a final remark, notice that in our model we have not considered any potential density-
related externality regarding production function (such as economies of scale). Nonetheless, 
even with a simple neoclassical function, agglomerations emerge as an equilibrium as long as 
there are concave externalities with a monotonic change on population well-being. Including 
production externalities with a concave functional form, as for the households, will add an 




In this section we present the data used to estimate the model on population density across 
European regions, which is presented in the following section.  
Level of aggregation 
As the aim of our article is to identify to what extent geographic drivers explain differences in 
population density, we need delimited regions to be small enough to consider their geographic 
attributes as representative of the region, and large enough to preclude specific municipalities 
or metropolitan areas that are particular agglomerations within a region. Therefore, we choose 
the level of aggregation denoted by NUTS 2 from the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics of Eurostat, which have populations of between 800,000 and three million. The 
current NUTS 2016 classification, valid since 1 January 2018, lists 323 regions at NUTS 2 
level.  
We consider only EU member states, because other countries included in NUTS 
classifications, such as Switzerland or Norway, are missing key data from Eurostat. We also 
exclude EU territories located outside Europe, namely five from France (Overseas France), 
three from Spain (Ceuta, Melilla and Canary Islands), and two from Portugal (Açores and 
Madeira). Moreover, we include Bremen (DE50) in Lüneburg (DE93), Hamburg (DE60) in 
Schleswig-Holstein (DEF0), and we group all five London NUTS regions into one single NUTS 
2 area. We end up with 258 NUTS 2 specimens. We consider density of population as at January 
1, 2019. 
Geographic indicators 
We consider several potential geographic drivers of population density (as in Mitton 2016): 
temperature, rainfall, access to navigable waters and unevenness of the land. 
Temperature 
We use the daily heating and cooling degree days of each region. Degree days are used as an 
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indicator of energy demand for the heating or cooling of buildings by comparing the day’s 
average outside temperature against the optimal threshold of 18°C. The heating degree day 
(HDD) is the number of degrees below the threshold, the cooling degree day (CDD) the 
number of degrees above it . We compute average HDDs and CDDs during the period 1977 to 
2018, using data from Eurostat. 
Daily rainfall 
Average daily rainfall (l/m2) has been calculated using Copernicus Project data from 1977 to 
2018. 
Access to navigable waters 
We have considered two main variables to capture access to navigable water. The first variable 
is the distance in kilometers from the boundary of the region to the nearest sea (or ocean). The 
second variable is direct accessibility to navigable rivers, that is, the kilometers of navigable 
river per squared kilometer of the NUTS2. We consider navigable rivers as those rivers with 
more than 100 segments or with a Strahler index higher than 5, according to the European 
Environment Agency Spatialite file for rivers. Figure 4 shows the map of the navigable rivers 
considered. 
 
Figure 4. Main rivers in Europe. 
Unevenness 
We calculated unevenness as the interquartile range of the height of every LUCAS (Land Use 
and Coverage Area frame Survey) grid point of each NUTS 2 area. LUCAS is a survey carried 
out by Eurostat every three years to identify changes in land use and coverage. It contains 





We have considered as natural resources the presence of coal mines or oil refineries within the 
boundaries of the region. Data have been obtained from the Refineries Sites in Europe Database 
(Concawe Organitzation) and from the European Commission. Table 1 shows a description of the 
geographic data. 
  
Table 1: Summary of the data set 
Variable Mean St. Dev 
Daily HDD 7.93 2.35 
Daily CDD 0.16 0.24 
Daily rain (l/m2) 2.07 0.60 
Distance to nearest sea (km)   116.67 145.55 
River density (km river/km2)   17.34 17.83 
Unevenness (km) 0.2440 0.2434 
Natural resources (%) 39.45 48.97 




Our approach to determining the relationship between geographic variables and population 
density is to build a linear regression model over the logarithm of the density of population, using 
the geographic indicators described, that is: 
 𝐺𝐸(𝑖) ≡ log(𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ) =  ∑ 𝛼 𝐺𝐼 + 𝑢   (6) 
 
where GE(i) refers to the geographic endowment given to the i-th NUTS 2 region, that is defined 
as the logarithm of its density of population. GIi,j is the value of the j-th geographic indicator of 
the NUTS 2 region i, and ui is the residual. 
We exclude regions containing capital cities, since their population density can be 
strongly biased by political intervention. As the theoretical model suggests that small 
differences in geographic endowment can lead to substantial differences in density of 
population, the geographic indicators are included in quadratic form. Moreover, we distinguish 
between warmer and cooler seas by introducing an interaction between distance to the sea and 
temperature. Table 2 shows the results of a model built by weighting regions by their area size, 
so smaller regions are less important as the model is about density, and by selecting significant 
variables at 15 percent or higher. We perform two estimations. First, a Bayesian estimation 
using the brms package available in R (Bürkner 2017), without a prior to avoid introducing any 
bias. The Bayesian estimation does not assume asymptotic properties of the estimates and 
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therefore is more suitable for significance tests on small sample sizes (Figure 5). Secondly, we 
also provide OLS estimates. As can be seen in Table 2, estimates are almost identical.  
Table 2: Geography endowment model 
 Bayesian estimation OLS 
Variable name Estimate Std. Error Estimate Robust Std. Error 
Constant 1.65874*** 0.42509 1.65620** 0.82357 
HDD 0.13837*** 0.06235 0.13642 0.11530 
HDD2 -0.01687*** 0.00289 -0.01680*** 0.00645 
Rain 2.01921*** 0.31475 2.03330*** 0.63571 
Rain2 -0.36743*** 0.06396 -0.37035*** 0.13885 
Uneveness−1 0.02243*** 0.00431 0.02244*** 0.00503 
Uneveness−2 -0.00004*** 0.00001 -0.00004*** 0.00001 
Distance to the sea -0.01028*** 0.00214 -0.01031*** 0.00255 
HDD: Distance to sea 0.00129*** 0.00024 0.00129*** 0.00029 
Natural resources 0.29930*** 0.08413 0.29795*** 0.09853 
Significance codes: ***: p< 0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p< 0.1. 
N: 233 (capital regions not included) 




Figure 5: Distribution of the parameters of the model using a Bayesian estimation 
 
Notice that CDDs are not important, and only HDDs matter. This is because Europe is a 
relatively cold area, with an average of only 0.16 CDD versus 7.93 HDD. Notice also that only 
distance to the sea is important in terms of access to navigable waters. It may seem counter-
intuitive that rivers are not relevant, but the explanation is that most regions have a navigable river 
(72 percent of the regions, corresponding to 88 percent of the total European area). Since the 
river network is very dense across Europe, it has no significant impact at a regional level. 
However, as we will see later, rivers do determine distribution within a region, that is, where to 





Understanding why a model makes a certain prediction can be as crucial as the prediction’s 
accuracy. It provides insight into how a model can be improved and supports understanding 
of the process being modeled. To do so, we evaluate feature importance and plot the marginal 
relation estimated by the model between explanatory features and the target (partial dependence 
functions). 
To evaluate feature importance, we estimate SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanation; 
Lundberg and Lee 2017, 2019) values. Given an observation 𝑥 = (𝑥 , … , 𝑥 ), the SHAP value of 
feature j on the instance x corresponds to how the concrete value of feature j on x modifies the 
output of the model with respect to other instances that share some of the features of x, but not 
j. For a parametric model 𝐹(𝑥) =  𝑔(∑ 𝛼 𝑥 ), where 𝑔 is a function of the weighted features 
of x, the SHAP value corresponds to: 𝜑 (𝑥) =  𝛼 (𝑥 − 𝐸 𝑋 ), where X is the set of 
observations and 𝐸(𝑋 ) is the average value of the j feature on X. Then, noting by N the total 
number of observations, we can estimate the relative importance of the feature j in the model 
as 
 
𝑅𝐼 =  
∑ |𝜑 (𝑥 )|
∑ ∑ |𝜑 (𝑥 )|
 
 
Table 3 shows the relative importance of each driver. 
 
Table 3: Relative importance of the geographic factors 
Factor Relative importance 
Temperature 44.56% 
Rain 19.00% 
Access to navigable waters 13.12% 
Unevenness 11.81% 
Natural resources 11.51% 
NOTE: SHAPs weighted by area. 
 
Temperature is by far the most important geographic factor explaining population 
density. Access to navigable waters has a relatively low importance, although that might be a 
singular characteristic of Europe, because most of the continent is made up of small surface 
peninsulas, so navigable seas and oceans are relatively close everywhere.  
Apart from overall feature importance, it is also pertinent to understand whether the 
relationship between the target and a feature is linear, monotonic or more complex. Partial 
dependence functions estimate the marginal effect that features have on the predicted outcome 
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of a model (Friedman, 2001). Therefore, they correspond to SHAP values. As we can see in 
Figure 6, partial dependence plots show that geographic endowment decreases as the HDD 
increases; that is, the colder the region, the less attractive it is. In terms of rainfall, the curve 




Figure 6. Partial dependence plots for non-binary variables. 
 
The distance to the sea impacts differently according to temperature. For warm regions 
(in Figure 6, defined as having an HDD of less than 7, with an average of 4.99), such as 
Mediterranean countries, the effect is more relevant and positive: the closer to the sea, the better. 
For cold regions (in Figure 6, those regions with an HDD over 8, with an average of 9.61), the 
effect is almost not relevant and being closer to the sea does not increase geographic 
endowment. On the one hand, for cold countries with direct access to the sea, such as the UK or 
Finland, it is not relevant because almost all NUTS 2 areas have access. Moreover, the sea may 
not be always easily navigable, as it freezes. For cold countries without direct access to the sea, 
such as Austria or the Czech Republic, because they are crossed by navigable rivers, geographic 
dynamics are largely determined by the other factors. 
Interestingly, as predicted by the theoretical framework presented above, geographic 
endowment tends to produce extreme population density outcomes, as can be seen in the quadratic 
relationships with respect to temperature and rainfall, or the inverse relationship with respect to 
unevenness. 
Assuming that the greater the number of people who want to live in an area, the higher is its 
attractiveness, the geographic endowment (GE) can be interpreted as a proxy for the 
attractiveness of a region (to European people) based on its geographic attributes. Obviously, 
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there are several other factors that may influence population density, such as historical events 
(e.g., wars), cultural and religious differences or public investment. However, the GE constitutes 
an ideal framework for assessing to what extent population is distributed according to geography 
within a country and identifying the cause of misadjustment between current and expected 
distribution, and which of those, if any, are a consequence of deviating from geography. 
 
Analysis of population distribution by country 
Our analysis of population distribution by country comprises two parts. First, we analyze 
whether the choice of capital city is geographically optimal. Second, we estimate the degree of 
geographic harmonization for each country by the percentage of the population that would have 
to move to another region within the same country to achieve the expected distribution of 
population according to the geographic endowment. 
Capital cities 
To evaluate the choice of the capital location, in terms of geography, we calculated the relative 
potential of the NUTS 2 region in which the capital is situated with respect to the maximum 










Table 4 presents the relative potential of the capitals of those countries considered in the 
analysis, with the exception of countries that consists of a single NUTS 2 region. It also presents 
the difference between the geographic factors of the capital and the average of those across the 
country. Although access to navigable waters is captured in the model by distance, we also 
included whether the capital city has a river. Rivers play an important role in deciding where to 
place the city within a region: all but Madrid (Spain) have a navigable river. 
As shown by the theoretical model developed above, capital cities, which are highly 
populated areas with relatively high output per capita, are generally placed in nearly optimal 
areas, as their endowment almost reaches the maximum potential of the country (91.8 over 100). 
Madrid in Spain is the most notable exception, scoring only 59.5 over 100. It is placed in the very 
middle of Spain and on the high Spanish plateau, completely isolated from the sea, in a relatively 





 Table 4: Capital attractiveness 









Germany 100 0.8 0.2 53.2 146.1 Yes 
Croatia 100 -0.3 -0.4 -110.8 -131.7 Yes 
Portugal 100 0.6 -0.5 37.6 -216.9 Yes 
Romania 100 -1.6 0.1 -27.8 -152.1 Yes 
Italy 100 -1.1 0.1 -57.3 -286.6 Yes 
Ireland 99.4 -1.4 -0.3 0.0 -129.0 Yes 
Netherlands 97.7 -1.6 -0.5 -15.7 -86.6 Yes 
United Kingdom 97.7 -0.3 0.1 -48.2 54.1 Yes 
Bulgaria 95.6 0.0 0.2 -20.3 -6.8 Yes 
Sweden 95.4 -0.9 0.2 0.0 -154.8 Yes 
Slovenia 95.1 -1.1 -0.2 -5.0 -190.7 Yes 
Denmark 94.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -4.3 Yes 
Czechia 92.1 0.0 -0.4 27.7 -219.7 Yes 
France 89.4 0.2 -0.1 -22.6 -39.7 Yes 
Greece 89.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 Yes 
Poland 88.6 -2.4 -1.1 113.2 -496.3 Yes 
Austria 88.1 -0.7 -0.1 22.2 -169.8 Yes 
Hungary 86.9 -0.1 -0.2 30.7 4.9 Yes 
Belgium 86.7 -1.4 0.0 0.0 -18.3 Yes 
Finland 85.0 -1.0 -0.2 -87.6 -188.9 Yes 
Slovakia 80.2 -0,4 -0,1 -9,7 -32,0 Yes 
Spain 59.5 0,4 -0,4 200,5 -171,2 No 
Average 91.8 -0.6 -0.2 3.6 -112.3 Yes 
 
Population misadjustment 
The GE is an estimation of the logarithm of the density of population. Thus, it can be used to 
estimate the expected density of population that every region should have if population were 
distributed according to geographic characteristics. For each country, we estimate the theoretical 
size of the population that should live in each region, subject to the constraint that total 
population cannot change. Let us note by EP(NUTSi) the expected population of region i, and 
by 𝐴  its area. Then,  
 







where country C is the country where the i region is located, 𝑘 = {1, … 𝑁 } are the 
regions that in country C and PC is the total population of C. 
Given the expected population of every region and the real population, we estimate the 
percentage of total population that would have to move in order to achieve the expected 
distribution. We also adjust for the capital bias. Capital bias is the result of differences in how 
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countries classify their capital city. Some countries, such as Belgium, consider the capital city 
to be a NUTS 2 area. Others, such as Spain or France, consider the capital city with its 
metropolitan area to comprise the NUTS 2 zone. While others, such as Croatia, include their 
capital city in a NUTS 2 region that contains not only the city and its metropolitan area, but 
also a significant part of the country. The larger the territory included in the NUTS 2 sector, the 
lower the misadjustment due to the capital, since it is diluted among a larger area. To correct for 
this, we adjust the estimation of population misadjustment by country, delimiting the NUTS 2 
area of all capitals according to the boundaries of their metropolitan region, splitting the given 
NUTS 2 zone into two regions, when needed. 
Table 5 presents the results of population misadjustment. On average, 24.4 percent of the 
population would have to move within their country in order to achieve a purely geography-
based distribution of population, in a range that extends from 14.4 percent (Bulgaria) to 35.6 
percent (Spain). Without the correction for capital bias, results are very similar, with the 
exception of Croatia and Ireland, whose misadjustment would be underestimated because they 
include their capital within a NUTS 2 region far larger that the metropolitan area. 
 
Table 5: Population misadjustment 
Country 
% misadjustment adjusted by 
capital effect 
% misadjustment not adjusted by 
capital effect 
Bulgaria 14.4 9.6 
Slovenia 15.1 10.5 
Czechia 16.0 15.9 
Romania 16.3 16.4 
Poland 16.9 14.8 
Finland 19.2 18.7 
Croatia 20.6 7.5 
Slovakia 22.9 22.9 
Sweden 24.0 24.2 
Belgium 24.1 23.1 
Germany 24.2 26.3 
Italy 24.2 21.3 
Austria 24.7 23.4 
France 25.3 25.3 
Netherlands 26.4 27.0 
Hungary 26.4 26.1 
Denmark 28.9 28.5 
Ireland 31.5 30.0 
Portugal 32.4 32.4 
United Kingdom 34.1 35.3 
Greece 34.2 34.2 
Spain 35.6 35.6 
Average 24.4 23.1 
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Figure 7 shows the comparison between current distribution of population and the 
expected distribution according to geographic endowment. Figure 8 shows the necessary 
change for regions to transition from current to expected distribution. That is, it shows the 
percentage increase needed for the resident population of the NUTS 2 area to meet expected 
population distribution. Green regions are those that are underpopulated with respect to the 
expected distribution. Therefore, more people should live there so there should be a population 
increase. Red regions are the opposite. They are overpopulated areas, whose population should 
decrease so as to achieve the expected distribution. In Portugal, for example, we can see that 
there is a highly overpopulated region, Lisbon (the dark red point), which would need to reduce 
its current population by more than 50 percent, and two moderately overpopulated regions that 
would need a decrease in current population of between 25 percent and 50 percent: the northern 




Figure 7. Current population distribution in Europe (left) vs. expected according to 






Figure 8. Percentage change in population by NUTS2 that would be needed to adjust actual 
population distribution with expected. 
 
 The theoretical model presented above introduced three potential drivers of greater 
deviations in population distribution in the long run: information asymmetry, moving costs and 
policy interventions. From results displayed in Table 5 and from Figures 7 and 8, the latter 
seems to emerge as the most relevant, at least for those countries in which the misadjustment is 
particularly high (above 30 percent): Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland.  
 These five countries share the trait of being peripheral in the context of the European 
continent. Hence, they are more isolated, which implies that any policy altering population 
distribution could be less affected by other countries’ policies.  
 In the case of Ireland and the United Kingdom, parallel processes of consolidation took 
place as global hubs of large firms developed toward the end of the last century. Many 
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multinational firms relocated to the Dublin area in the 1980s and 1990s (Gunnigle and McGuire 
2001), following Ireland’s entry into the European Union (then the EEC) in 1973, and corporate 
tax reforms introduced in 1997 and 1999 by the minister of finance, Charlie McCreevy, lowered 
corporate taxes from 32 percent to 12.5 percent and thus laid the framework for Ireland’s base 
erosion and profit shifting tools (BEPS), considered among the world’s largest (Torslov, Wier 
and Zucman 2020). As a result, the Greater Dublin area has experienced an impressive 
population growth of 46 percent over the last 30 years (source 
http://www.greaterdublindrainage.com/ ) while the rest of the state grew by 30 percent, 
consolidating a secular trend for the preeminence of Dublin that dates back to the end of the 
Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) and the Civil War (1922-1923).2  
 In the case of the United Kingdom, the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s 
(removal of controls on foreign exchange and fixed rate commissions, entry of foreign 
companies, switch to electronic trading, etc.), helped to kick off a financial transformation, 
dubbed the ‘Big Bang’, that cemented London as the global financial capital. Many financial 
institutions relocated to London, and its metropolitan area experienced a population growth 
similar to that of Greater Dublin. From 1991 to 2019 it grew by 34 percent, while the rest of the 
UK population grew by 16 percent.3 This growth is far larger than that experienced in other 
important European capital areas such as Paris, Berlin, Rome, or Amsterdam. Among the large 
capital cities, only Madrid has experienced such a large growth of population (33 percent in 
Madrid vs. 20 percent in the rest of Spain). 
 Spain, Greece and Portugal, besides the common trait of being peripheral countries in 
the EU, share another characteristic: the three of them have French civil law systems and legal 
origins (La Porta et al. 2008). This has determined a type of nation-building based on the French 
model and a very centralized administrative tradition, which drive territorial policies 
persistently targeted to reinforce the political and economic role of the capital city in the 
country.4 The paradigmatic case is that of Spain, which has been analyzed in Bel (2011, 2012). 
Other studies have documented the extreme degree of political centralization in Portugal 
                                                        
2 After the Civil War, Dublin was consolidated as the political capital. Its population grew from around 
500,000 inhabitants in 1925 to 1,025,000 in 1991. Cork, which was the main city opposing the Anglo-
Irish Treaty (1921), lost political influence and economic relevance and its population only grew 
112.000 inhabitants during the same period.  
3 Data obtained from https://worldpopulationreview.com/ on June 6, 2020.  
4 It is worth noting that even though it is not a peripheral country, France has a misadjustment rate of 
25.3 percent, slightly above the average figure for Europe (24.4 percent). The fact that France is more 
centrally located in the continental context may have palliated the effect of this type of nation-building, 
and derived administrative tradition and territorial policies on population misadjustment. 
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(Magone 2011) and Greece (Ifantis 2004).5 One of the probable consequences of these nation-
building policies has been a particularly strong promotion of concentration of the population in 
the capital city of the country, which is the most important factor explaining the extremely 
intense misadjustment of population in these countries. 
 
Economic consequences of population misadjustment 
According to the theoretical model presented above, deviations from nature in terms of 
population distribution lead to non-Pareto allocations of population, which may be perpetuated 
due to the high cost of moving, incomplete information, and overinvestment in overpopulated 
areas designed to compensate for overpopulation externalities. Hence, no matter the underlying 
reason, greater deviations from nature are expected to be associated with lower utility and, 
potentially, higher inequality. To test these two economic consequences of population 
misadjustment, in this section we present an empirical estimation of the impact of population 
misadjustment on economic growth and inequality. 
Regional conditional convergence 
Conditional convergence theory states that an economy grows faster the further it is from its 
own steady-state value (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995), which is conditioned by different 
covariates such as the saving rate or human capital (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). As it 
allows for different steady states, it is a widely used framework for analysis of the long-term 
drivers of economic growth (see, among others, Barro 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1997), and for 
testing convergence between regions located in different countries (see, for example, Cartone, 
Postiglione, and Hewings 2020). 
To test whether population misadjustment has an effect on economic convergence, we 
estimate a model of the form: 
 𝑔 =  𝛾 +  𝛾 q +  𝛾 𝑠 + 𝛾 ℎ +  𝛾 𝑝𝑚 + 𝛾 𝑐 +  𝜀  (9) 
 
where 𝑔  is the GDP per capita growth rate of the region 𝑖 over the period 2000-2018, 
𝑞  is the natural log of the initial GDP per capita, ℎ  is the human capital, 𝑠  is the natural 
logarithm of the saving rate, 𝑝𝑚  is the population misadjustment of the country in which the 
region 𝑖 is situated (as at the year 2000), 𝑐  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the capital city 
                                                        
5 In Lundell (2004), Spain, Greece and Portugal appear as the countries with the most centralized 
systems of party candidate selection for elections in the (then) EU15. 
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is in the region i, and 𝜀  is the residual. Human capital is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the percentage of the population aged between 25 and 64 years that has the highest education 
level (ISCED level 5–8, corresponding to tertiary levels), and the saving and investment rate as 
a share of GDP, as at the year 2000. Data have been obtained from Eurostat. 
We present three different estimations of equation (9). In the first estimation, all regions 
are weighted equally in the quadratic error minimization. In the second estimation, we weight 
regions by total population. Therefore, regions with larger populations are considered to be 
more representative, to contain more information. Finally, we also present an estimation that 
weights regions according to their relative population within their respective countries. Hence 
all countries contribute equally to the model. 
Table 6 presents the results for the three estimations of the conditional convergence 
model. We only provide OLS results because they are almost identical to Bayesian estimates. 
It can be seen that population misadjustment has a negative impact on economic convergence. 
This result is consistently statistically significant at 1 percent across models. Countries that 
deviate farther from nature tend to have less growth and lower steady states. Therefore, the 
greater the deviation the lower the speed of convergence and the inter-regional inequality 
decrease, both non-weighted and weighted by population (Concept 1 and Concept 2 inequality, 
as dubbed by Milanovic 2005), and the lower the total welfare of the population. Concretely, 
for each 10 percentage points of misadjustment, annual growth is reduced by around 0.5 to 0.7 
percentage points. Moreover, as expected from the theoretical model, the positive estimate of 
the capital city parameter confirms that part of this effect consists of a rent transfer to over-
populated regions by means of a public intervention. 
Finally, to gain a complete understanding of the convergence model beyond the 
significance of the parameters, we estimate the relative importance of each variable included in 
the model. We use  again the methodology suggested by Lundberg and Lee (2017, 2019): SHAP 
(SHapley Additive ExPlanation) values. Table 7 presents the relative importance of each 
variable in the conditional convergence model. The initial GDP is the most relevant variable 
and accounts for 50 percent to 60 percent of the total predictive power of the model, depending 
on the estimation. Remarkably, the population misadjustment and the capital city effect jointly 



















































R2 0.6313 0.6921 0.5811 
F 82.18 107.9 66.6 
N = 246. 9 regions (6 from Poland, 3 from UK) excluded because of missingness of data. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***: p< 0.01; **: p< 0.05; *: p< 0.1, +: p<0.15 
NOTES:  
a) Estimations excluding Ireland, that changed their GDP calculations in 2015 which resulted in a >10% increase that 
year, lead to results with higher predictive power (especially for the first and third estimation, where the R squared 
increase up to ~0.72) and a <1% signification of the capital parameter in the third estimation. The estimated parameters 
are modified by less than 10% (relatively) 
b) Including population growth, depreciation and technological progress as a covariate (as in Cartone, Postiglione and 
Hewings, 2020) does not modify the results (less than 10%, relatively), since the variable is not significant. However, 8 
additional regions would be removed because of missing data. 
 
Table 7: Relative importance based on SHAP value 




Weighted by relative 
population 
logGDP2000 52.5% 56.1% 60.6% 
Misadjustment 23.4% 19.9% 23.1% 
LogEducation 15.4% 17.0% 10.1% 
LogSavings 0 0 0 
CapitalCity 8.7% 7.0% 6.2% 
 
Income inequality  
Apart from the effect on economic growth and regional convergence, we also test whether 
countries that deviate farther from nature exhibit higher within-country income inequality 
(Concept 3 inequality, as dubbed by Milanovic 2005). As per the theoretical model, greater 
deviations are expected to be associated with higher income inequality to compensate (at least 
partially) for over-population externalities. 
Table 8 presents the estimation of a model to test the relationship between inequality 
(measured as the GINI market income, obtained from Eurostat) and population misadjustment. 
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The relationship is significant and positive, implying that greater deviation from nature is 
associated with higher inequality.  
 
Table 8: GINI market income vs population misadjustment 
 Bayesian estimation OLS 
Variable name Estimate Std. Error Estimate Robust Std. Error 
Constant 41.8873*** 3.4752 41.9160*** 3.5740 
HDD 0.3277** 0.1377 0.3263** 0.1383 
Significance codes: ***: p< 0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p< 0.1. 
N: 22 countries 
 R-squared: 0.2321. F-statistic: 6.045 
 
Discussion 
Our results provide empirical evidence that large population misadjustments with respect to 
geographic endowment come at a cost. As expected from our model, the farther a country 
deviates from the expected population distribution based on its geographic endowment, the 
lower its regional convergence and the higher its economic inequality will be. Remarkably, part 
of the effect consists of a rent transfer to the capital city. 
These results, together with those obtained in the section “Analysis of the population 
distribution by country; Population misadjustment”, suggest a potential novel causality channel 
by which institutions affect economic performance. 
Recent economic growth literature has emphasized the role of institutions in economic 
growth and development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2005; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; Mitton, 2016, among others). ‘Institutions’ is a 
broad term that includes the diverse, complex interaction of individuals, firms, states, legislation 
and social norms which make up a society’s social, economic, legal and political organization 
(see North 1981).6 According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), these institutions are intimately 
linked to the distribution of political power in society and, as such, regulate the relationship 
between ordinary private citizens and elites with access to political power. Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) propose a taxonomy of four categories of institutions that can 
impact economic performance. Institutions are 1) market-creating; 2) market regulating; 3) 
market stabilizing, and 4) market-legitimizing. 
                                                        
6 The definition of institutions in North (1981: 201-202) is “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and 
moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interest of 
maximizing the wealth or utility of principals.” 
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Thus, institutions have enough mechanisms to reverse the outcomes of nature and 
induce or promote the population distribution that best serves specific societal goals. As we 
showed, by using a framework of incentives, regulations and investments, institutions are the 
most relevant drivers of a population distribution equilibrium with extreme deviations from 
nature (as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002). In turn, population distribution 
influences economic growth and income distribution: by privileging certain regions with 
respect to others, institutions not only transfer rents to the privileged region, but also harm 
overall economic growth. 
On the one hand, for the three European continental countries with the most extreme 
misadjustments (Spain, Portugal and Greece) the deviation is the result of an intentional 
political intervention by central government, based on the desire to maintain control over the 
territory by privileging their capital regions (Madrid, Lisbon, and Athens, respectively). 
Political intervention in the design of policies such as transportation infrastructure, prioritizing 
objectives related to the administrative and political concentration of power, and largely 
neglecting productivity-related objectives, has probably prevented the development of an 
efficient distribution system in the economy, thus damaging potential economic growth. This 
is shown in the evidence obtained, for example, in the case of Spain, in Albalate, Bel and Fageda 
(2012) and Bertoméu-Sánchez and Estache (2017). The result of such intense forced deviations 
from nature is, according to our econometric results, detrimental to economic performance. 
On the other hand, the high concentrations of population in London and Dublin, which 
explain the greater misadjustment of the United Kingdom and Ireland, seem to be a consequence 
of public policies intended to promote the development of market forces and private industry 
located in those regions, taking advantage of the role of agglomeration economies with 
localized accumulated capital. However, this concentration may have come at the expense of 
other regions. For instance, in the case of the United Kingdom, as stated by Ronen Palan: “The 
Bank of England consistently pursued policies that favored the City’s position as a world 
financial center, even when such policies were seen as harmful to the UK’s mainland 
manufacturing needs.” (Palan 2010: 165). Inner London's GDP per capita was 328% of the 
European Union average in 2010, compared with 70 percent in West Wales - the biggest gap in 
any EU state, according to Eurostat.  
Rising inequality and economic performance differences between regions have become 
a relevant policy debate, and a desire to redress the balance is expressed all the way up to the 
top. In 2014, even the prime minister, David Cameron, said that for too long the UK economy 
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had been “too London-focused and too centralised”.7 He had already written, in 2009, that 




The expansion of knowledge and technological innovations in transportation and 
communication have led to claims of the end of geography; a world in which distance would 
not play any significant role in decisions about human settlements. In this article, we have 
analyzed whether the features of nature and geography still play a relevant role in economic 
and social outcomes, by facilitating or limiting location, concentration and growth of human 
settlements. 
We have proposed a theoretical model to represent the way in which geography and 
nature can account for regional economic growth, through their effects on population density 
and distribution. This model has been empirically examined using data from NUTS 2 European 
regions. This has allowed us to identify a strong predictive power of first-nature variables to 
explain the regional distribution of populations, and to estimate the degree of geographic 
harmonization of the actual distribution of population compared to the predicted distribution.  
After estimating the misadjustments between actual and predicted regional population 
distribution, we have analyzed their impact on relative economic performance, together with 
the impact of institution-related factors, such as the conditional of being the capital of the 
country. Our main results suggest that deviating from nature’s outcomes has a significant 
negative effect on economic growth and can increase inequalities. Hence, societies that choose 
to exploit the opportunities of the best locations, according to natural endowment, rather than 
promoting a different distribution of the population across regions by means of institutional 
intervention, achieve better economic performance and more social cohesion. That is, policies 
that harmonize with nature and geography yield better social welfare and human well-being 
than those policies that conflict with them. 
  
                                                        
7 This statement was acknowledged in the news article, “Regions to get £6 billion in government 
funding“, BBC News/Business, July 7, 2014. Retrieved on June 6, 2020 
(https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28190016). 







Variable Description Source Link 




Area Area of the NUTS2 Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference
-data/administrative-units-statistical-units/nuts 
HDD Average daily number of degrees 
below 18ºC from 1977 to 2018 
Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-
/nrg_chddr2_a 
CDD Average daily number of degrees 





Average daily rainfall (l/m2) from 













Nearest distance from the 






Interquartile range of the height 
(in km) of every LUCAS grid 






Dummy variable indicating 
whether there are coal mines or oil 












Regional GDP per capita (PPP), in 





Natural logarithm of the 
percentage of the population aged 
between 25 and 64 years that has 
the highest education level 
(ISCED level 5–8), in 2000 
Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-
datasets/product?code=edat_lfse_04 
Saving rate Natural logarithm of the 
percentage of the gross fixed 
capital formation (as a % of the 
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